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What Standards Apply When Freedoms Collide? 
by Neal Devins 
ISSUE 
Seattle Times Company, et al. 
v. 
Keith Milton Rhinehart, et al. 
(Docket No. 82-1721) 
To be argued February 21, 1984 
Freedom of the press is pitted against freedom of 
religion and access to the judicial system in Seattle Times 
Company v. Rhinehart. Although the Supreme Court will 
not have to determine whether any of these central 
constitutional values takes precedence over the other, 
the Court will have to determine how concrete a claim of 
infringement of religious liberty must be before a court 
can interfere with the rights of our free press. Specifi-
cally, the case questions whether and when it is constitu-
tional for a court to prohibit publication of information 
learned about the Aquarian Foundation (a so-called reli-
gious cult) in the course of civil discovery. The Aquarian 
Foundation alleges that publishing such information will 
discourage its members from instituting the underlying 
civil action. The freedom of religion and freedom of 
press claims are heightened in this case because the 
initial civil action is a suit for slander by the Aquarian 
Foundation against the Seattle Times. 
Religious organizations clearly have a right to seek 
both expansion of their membership and financial sup-
port. This right is central to our constitutional scheme 
and thus courts should be accessible to claimants seeking 
to protect their right to free exercise of religion. At the 
same time, this right does not protect such organizations 
from unfavorable press coverage. If our society is to 
function as an open marketplace, people should not be 
denied access to information. As far as information 
made available to the press through its own initiative, 
this "right to publish" is almost absolute. (A prime exam-
ple is the "Pentagon Papers'· lawsuit.) Yet, it does not 
seem unreasonable that this ··right to publish" should be 
limited when the press gains information through the 
civil discovery process of a lawsuit in which it is a party 
- especially when publishing such information might 
ultimately make it impossible to pursue the underlying 
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legal action. The tough question is what standard the 
courts should apply in determining whether there is 
good cause to limit the press' right to publish. The Seattle 
Times case will help answer that question. Considering 
the paramount interests involved, this lawsuit is of great 
significance. 
FACTS 
The Seattle Times ran a series of articles about a small 
religious group called the Aquarian Foundation and its 
leader, Keith Rhinehart. Included in these news reports 
were allegations that Rhinehart is a "Jim Jones Guyana-
like leader'· of a "bizarre Seattle cult" who is "unfit to be 
a religious leader," that Rhinehart's public exhibitions 
are "consciously perpetrated frauds" and his seances a 
··ripoff." The reports also charged that the Foundation 
is, in fact, Rhinehart's "alter ego," that the Foundation 
uses its ··wealth to buy religious converts" and that 
Rhinehart makes his money "by selling dimes tore jewel-
ry" for "thousands of dollars.'· In response to these 
allegations, Rhinehart and members of the Aquarian 
Foundation sued the Seattle Times for defamation. 
Rhinehart's claimed damages focused on an alleged 
loss of membership and contributions to the Founda-
tion. Yet, at civil discovery, Rhinehart refused to pro-
duce information concernin!?; these allegations. 
Rhinehart and the Foundation claimed "that revealing 
the information they did have would violate a pledge of 
secrecy made to the donors and would violate the mem-
bers' rights to privacy, freedom of religion and freedom 
of association." The trial court ordered the Foundation 
to provide this information. In response to this order, 
the Foundation sought a protective order to prohibit the 
Seattle Times from disseminating information it acquired 
through the discovery process. 
The Foundation claimed that: 1) it would lose mem-
bers and donors if their identities are publicized, and 
that potential members and donors would be deterred 
from joining or supporting the church, and 2) its mem-
bers feared economic reprisal and [physical] harassment 
if the public learned of their link with the Foundation. 
Objecting to this motion for a protective order, the 
Seattle Times argued that the proposed order would be 
an unconstitutional prior restraint and that the threat to 
First Amendment rights was "aggravated by the fact that 
these orders are requested in the context of a libel action 
which, itself, seeks to punish the defendants for prior 
publications, and which has an inherent (and presu-
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mably intended) effect of chilling future exercise of First 
Amendment rights." 
The trial court, on a motion for reconsideration, 
granted the protective order. The court concluded that 
the Foundation had shown "reasonable grounds" neces-
sitating a protective order which prohibited publishing 
any information learned in discovery about the Founda-
tion's "financial affairs'· and various individuals' names 
and addresses. The protective order, however, was li-
mited in that it did not extend to "the fruits of discovery 
[which] are made public through the judicial process [or 
by others independently of discovery]." 
The basis of the trial court order was the belief that: 
"[i]f protective orders are not available, it could have a 
chilling effect on a party's willingness to bring his case to 
court .... [A]ccess to the courts [should be put] on an 
equal plane of importance with freedom of the press 
because it is through the courts that our fundamental 
freedoms are protected and enforced." The Seattle Times 
appealed the trial court decision to the Washington Su-
preme Court. Although recognizing that the order was a 
prior restraint on the press, a maJority of the state Su-
preme Court upheld the order since "the interest of the 
judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is 
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' ofjustification" for 
the restraint in question. 
In October 1983, the Supreme Court granted the 
Seattle Times' petition to hear the case. Since the press 
possesses a substantial First Amendment right to dis-
seminate newsworthy information, the Seattle Times ar-
gues that the probative order should be nullified on two 
related grounds: 1) the protective order was based on 
speculative concerns unsupported by findings and thus 
does not justify a curb on First Amendment rights, and 
2) the Court should apply a test which closely scrutinizes 
granting protective orders. In countering the Seattle 
Times' argument, the Aquarian Foundation does not 
question that the newspaper's First Amendment rights 
are implicated by the lawsuit. Yet, rather than applying a 
··close scrutiny" test, the Foundation feels that its First 
Amendment rights of religious freedom, association, 
privacy and access to the courts should be balanced 
against the newspaper's "free press" interest. The Foun-
dation also argues that any First Amendment rights 
implicated in discovery are sufficiently protected by the 
good cause standards which govern issuing protective 
orders in Washington courts. 
The issue of whether a "balancing" or ·'close scruti-
ny" test should be applied will probably be determin-
ative to this lawsuit. The "balancing" test is premised on 
the notion that freedom of press cannot be preferred 
over any other First Amendment freedom. The Foun-
dation argues that the balance should be struck in its 
favor because publication of Foundation members and 
contributors will discourage future participation with 
the Foundation and lead to physical harassment of 
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Foundation members. Affidavits of various Foundation 
members support these claims. Rather than strenuously 
dispute this claim, the Seattle Times argues that freedom 
of the press - as illustrated by several federal court 
decisions- demands heightened judicial scrutiny. 
The Seattle Times suggests that the Court apply the 
"close scrutiny" test developed by the D.C. Court of 
Appeals in In Re Halkin (598 F.2d 176 ( 1979)). The 
Halkin test would require that this criteria be met prior 
to granting a protective order: "the harm posed by dis-
semination must be substantial and serious; the restrain-
ing order must be narrowly drawn and precise, and 
there must be no alternative means of protecting the 
public interest which intrudes less directly on express-
ion." This test would require the Court to determine 
how each document or claim of information will cause 
concrete harm. Since most of the information sought to 
be restrained through the protective order will become 
public (and thus publishable) at the time of trial, the 
Seattle Times argues that the protective order should be 
quashed since it merely "permit[s] one litigant, for tacti-
cal reasons, to control the timing and manner of disclo-
sure." The Aquarian Foundation disputes this claim. It 
argues that, without the protective order, it would be 
unable to disclose all relevant facts to facilitate the ad-
ministration of justice. 
The Aquarian Foundation also argues that Washing-
ton's "good cause" requirement, which governs protec-
tive orders, sufficiently protects the newspaper's First 
Amendment interests. In support of this contention, the 
Foundation suggests that "[c]ourts have inherent power 
to control their own proceedings in the pursuit of justice 
and have full power to prohibit a party ... from divulg-
ing otherwise private information divulged through the 
court's own processes." The Seattle Times, although not 
specifically addressing this claim, posits that "[a]bstract 
concepts, such as the 'integrity' of the judicial system, 
cannot by themselves support the drastic curb upon 
expression effected by the protective order." 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Seattie Times is more a case of great symbolic value 
than a case of immediate practical significance. In all 
likelihood, the information covered by the protective 
order will be made public (and thus publishable) at trial. 
Consequently, neither party stands that much to gain or 
lose by the Supreme Court decision. The Seattle Times 
will have an opportunity to publish the information 
subject to the protective order at the time of trial. The 
Aquarian Foundation will not be able to absolutely fore-
close the publication of information subject to the pro-
tective order. The case thus boils down to whether 
freedom of the press should be accorded such constitu-
tional weight as to virtually eliminate protective orders, 
or whether access to the courts should be accorded such 
constitutional weight as to justify protective orders 
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whenever discovery will likely lead to the publication of 
information harmful to the interests of one of the par-
ties in the lawsuit. 
Where should the balance be struck? The right to 
disseminate information learned in civil litigation is 
rooted in the basic First Amendment "principle that 
debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust 
and wideopen.'' (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270 (1964)) Additionally, lawsuits are themselves 
newsworthy and frequently involve matters of public 
concern. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
civil litigation is itself a First Amendment activity. (See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963)) 
Notwithstanding the primacy of freedom of the 
press protections, the Aquarian Foundation also has the 
fundamental right to bring its grievances before the 
courts. In the context of Seattle Times, access to the courts 
is particularly significant since the case affects the ability 
of a religious group to seek members and solicit funds. 
Considering the unpopularity of the Foundation and its 
beliefs, scrupulous protection of the First Amendment 
rights of its members and donors is particularly impor-
tant. (See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian School Inc., 556 
F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 1977)) Additionally, protective 
orders may encourage full disclosure of relevant in-
formation and thus result in a more complete adjudica-
tion of the merits of a case. 
The values of access to the courts, freedom of reli-
gion and freedom of press are all central to our constitu-
tional scheme. Seattle Times, by presenting the Court with 
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an opportunity to adopt a standard of review for protec-
tive orders, will help determine how these First Amend-
ment values should play against each other. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Rhinehart, the Aquarian Foundation, et al. 
1. The protective order is justified since the First 
Amendment rights of Aquarian Foundation mem-
bers and donors outweigh the First Amendment 
rights of the Seattle Times. 
2. The protective order satisfies the ''close scrutiny" test 
advocated by the Seattle Times. 
3. Washington's rules of procedure governing protec-
tive orders are sufficiently comprehensive to encom-
pass possible countervailing First Amendment 
concerns. 
For the Seattle Times, et al. 
1. The Court should adopt the ''close scrutiny" test de-
lineated in In re Halkin to fully recognize the First 
Amendment interest in dissemination and the limited 
government interest in protective orders. 
2. The Aquarian Foundation failed to introduce suffi-
cient evidence to justify a protective order. 
AMICUS ARGUMENTS 
The American Civil Liberties Union in association 
with various newspaper associations filed an amicus 
brief in support of the Seattle Times, with arguments 
identical to those made by the Seattle Times' brief. 
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